INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

PERU

SELECTED ISSUES

May 2024

This paper on Peru was prepared by a staff team of the International Monetary Fund as background documentation for the periodic consultation with the member country. It is based on the information available at the time it was completed on May 2, 2024.

International Monetary Fund
Washington, D.C.

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SELECTED ISSUES

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Approved By
Western Hemisphere Department

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CONTENTS

PRODUCTIVITY AND GROWTH IN PERU[1]

After a decade of high economic growth averaging over 6 percent per year, potential growth has been falling since 2014. The decline has been driven by a much slower pace of investment and human capital accumulation, but most notably, a decline in total factor productivity growth. In line with the macroeconomic trends, firm-level productivity has worsened, and the decline has been broad-based across the economy. Special corporate tax regimes and labor legislations and regulations have created barriers to productivity growth. To raise productivity, policies will need to focus on reforming regulations that impose excessive costs to formalizing or growing a business. Down the line, introducing greater labor market flexibility would ensure that workers can transition to productive sectors of the economy and reduce labor informality.

A. Macro-Level Measures of Potential Output

1.   After a decade of high economic growth averaging over 6 percent per year, Peru's economic growth has disappointed since 2014. There is a growing consensus that potential growth has declined since 2014.[2] Recent estimates have ranged from 2.3 percent (Banco Central de Reserva del Perú, 2023) to 2.6 percent (Sánchez and Renato Vassallo, 2023). While many shocks have hit the Peruvian economy in recent years, there is a concern that the COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated the slowdown in potential growth.

2.   Three approaches—a univariate Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, a multivariate filter, and the production function approach—were used to estimate potential growth. For the HP filter, potential output was estimated by applying the HP filter to the annual real GDP series from 1990 to 2028 and using a smoothing parameter of 100. Using the smooth parameter suggested by Ravn and Uhlig (2002) yields similar results. For the multivariate filter, potential output was estimated following Alichi et al. (2017) and Blagrave et al. (2015) with the following specifications:

$$\text{Output Gap} \quad Y_t = \varphi Y_{t-1} + \varepsilon_Y$$

$$\text{Phillips Curve} \quad \pi_t = \lambda \pi_{t+1} + (1 - \lambda)\pi_{t-1} + \beta Y_t + \varepsilon_\pi$$

$$\text{Okun's Law} \quad u_{gap,t} = \tau_1 u_{gap,t-1} + \tau_2 Y_t + \varepsilon_{ugap}$$

where Y is the output gap, π is the inflation rate, and u indicates the unemployment rate gap. For the production function approach, potential output was estimated using a Cobb-Douglas production function of the form $Y_t = A_t \cdot K_t^\alpha \cdot L_t^{1-\alpha}$, using 0.6 for the elasticity of capital, 0.4 for the elasticity of labor, a depreciation rate of 5 percent, and a steady-state growth rate of 3.8 percent

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[1] Prepared by Moya Chin (WHD) and Daria Kolpakova (WHD), with contributions from Matteo Ghilardi (WHD) on estimating potential output and aggregate productivity.

[2] See, for example, estimates from Castillo and Hoyle (2019) and IMF (2022).

(the average growth rate of GDP between 1951 and 2022) to calculate the initial capital stock in 1950.[3]

3.   Using these three approaches, potential growth was estimated at 2.0 to 2.5 percent. All three approaches show over a decade of high potential growth averaging over 5.5 percent between 2002-2013 then a steady decline to an average of 2.0-2.5 percent between 2017-2022, excluding 2020 when potential output sharply declined due to the pandemic. Estimates from the production function approach are more volatile and show a lower level of potential growth of about 0.5 percentage points after the pandemic.

4.   Potential growth has been declining in both the mining and non-mining economy. Potential growth in the mining and hydrocarbons sector is examined separately, as it may not exhibit the same growth patterns as the rest of the economy. Production relies on the stock of natural endowments, rather than accumulation of factors of production such as capital and labor, and is highly volatile due to commodity price cycles. Data on output, investment, and employment in the mining sector was collected to estimate potential output separately for the mining and non-mining economy. For the production function approach, a capital elasticity of 0.8 was used for the mining economy. While potential growth of the mining economy is estimated to be lower and more volatile than in the non-mining economy, it has been declining in both the mining and non-mining economy since 2014.

Figure 1. Peru: Actual and Potential GDP Growth

Sources: INEI, MINEM, ENAHO, BCRP and staff calculations.

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[3] Estimates of elasticity of capital by sector are from Céspedes et al. (2014). The stock of capital was estimated using the perpetual inventory method, and calculating the initial capital stock K_0 as:

$$K_0 = \frac{I_1}{g + d}$$

where I_1 is investment, g is the average GDP growth rate between 1950 and 2022, and d is the depreciation rate.

5.   More puzzling is the fact that TFP growth has been negative, even in the mining economy. TFP was the highest contributor to growth in the economy in 2002-2006, but its contribution rapidly declined and has been negative since 2012. Notably, while measured TFP growth in the mining and hydrocarbons sector is volatile and may reflect non-technological factors such as measurement error and capacity utilization, it has not been positive since 2007. The contribution of labor has remained stable in the economy, but its contribution is small and has been declining. Since 2007, capital has been the primary contributor to growth throughout the economy but as the rate of capital accumulation has been declining since 2012, so too has its contribution.

Figure 2. Peru: Growth Decomposition

Sources: INEI, MINEM, ENAHO, BCRP and staff calculations.

6.   Augmenting the production function with mining resources affirms the negative growth in TFP. Estimates of TFP using a production function that does not account for mining resources as a factor of production may overestimate the contribution of capital and underestimate TFP growth (Bakker, 2023; Hamilton et al. 2019). Augmenting the production function with mining resources as a third factor or production, using data from World Bank (2021), increases estimated TFP growth, but it remains negative. While the mining and hydrocarbons sector is an important share of exports, mining resource rents account for less than 15 percent of GDP, thus not leading to a large bias in TFP estimation.

B. Measuring Productivity Using Firm-Level Data

7.   Firm level data was used to estimate productivity at the microeconomic level. The analysis uses the Encuesta Ecónomica Annual (EEA), an annual survey of formal firms in Peru conducted by the INEI. The sample used is that of Schiffbauer et al. (2022), which restricts the sample to firms observed across multiple years and which are single establishments (which excludes many firms in the agricultural and mining sectors). This results in underrepresentation in microenterprises and overrepresentation in the commerce and manufacturing industries.

Notwithstanding these issues, the sample is a panel of firms, allowing to follow productivity dynamics over time within a firm, and captures a sizeable portion of the economy (total value-add represents 14 to 19 percent of GDP). Total factor productivity was estimated following the integrated control function approach of Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2015) and De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) and using a translog production function and including controls for firm age and municipality. The production function was estimated separately by industry.

8.   Since 2014, in line with the macroeconomic trends, firm-level productivity has worsened. Patterns of productivity growth at the firm level match the aggregate trends. Between 2007 and 2013, as the Peruvian economy expanded, firm-level productivity growth accelerated from about 4 percent to about 6 percent per year. Vostroknutova et al. (2015) found that during this period, many firms in Peru significantly narrowed their productivity gap with the United States. Between 2014 and 2017, productivity growth reversed, in line with the macroeconomic trends, averaging about -5 percent per year.

9.   The slowdown in productivity growth has been broad-based across the economy. Whether examining by industry, by firm size, or by region, firm-level productivity growth has worsened between 2014 and 2017 compared to earlier periods.[4] In 2014, total factor productivity of the median firm in the most productive sectors – firms in construction and other services, large firms, and firms located in the coastal regions – was over two times that in the rest of the economy. Nevertheless, firms in these sectors also experienced negative productivity growth between 2014 and 2017. Following Olley and Pakes (1996), a decomposition of productivity growth shows that most of the decline is accounted for by less productive firms growing faster in market share and the composition of firms entering and exiting the market, rather than a shift in the overall productivity distribution. This suggests that barriers to firm entry (which have prevented productive firms from entering and unproductive firms from exiting) and to firm growth (which have prevented productive firms from growing as fast as they could) may have played an important role in productivity dynamics.

Figure 3. Peru: Firm-Level Total Factor Productivity Growth
Percent annualized growth, weighted by value added.

Sources: EEA and staff calculations.

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
[4] Small firms are defined as microenterprises and small enterprises, which SUNAT defines as firms with below 1,700 UIT in annual sales. Large firms are defined as medium and large enterprises, which SUNAT defines as firms with above 1,700 UIT in annual sales.

10.   Labor and tax legislations and regulations can create barriers to firm growth and productivity. Several labor and tax legislations and regulations in Peru are implemented using eligibility thresholds, which can create distortions in two ways. First, threshold-based regulations can create incentives for firms to maintain smaller sizes to take advantage of different regulations (or lack thereof). Second, threshold-based regulations impose a non-linear application of a regulation, which then translates into non-linear costs on firms. For example, Agosin et al. (2010) notes that moving between the various special corporate tax regimes in Peru can reduce profits by 30 to 50 percent. The result is that firms are not incentivized to formalize and grow, either to evade regulations or to maintain a certain level of sales and profits. These barriers to formalize and grow in Peru have likely contributed to the lack of medium-sized firms and high inequality in productivity between large and small firms (Agosin et al., 2010; Vostroknutova et al., 2015). The lack of incentives to formalize are particularly important, as informality is tightly linked with productivity.


Industry Productivity and Labor Informality
2007-2017

Source: EEA, ENAHO, and staff calculations

11.   To investigate these potential barriers, two labor and tax regulations are analyzed. The first is a profit-sharing legislation. Decreto Legislativo No. 892 was introduced in 1996 and requires firms with more than 20 employees to share a certain percentage of profits with their workers. Firms in fishing, manufacturing, and telecommunications industries are required to share 10 percent of profits with workers. Firms in commerce, hospital, and mining industries are required to share 8 percent of profits with workers. Firms in all other sectors are required to share 5 percent of profits with workers. The second legislation is one of the special corporate tax regimes, the Régimen Especial del Impuesto a la Renta (RER). The RER was introduced in 2007 and applies to firms in extractive, manufacturing, trade, service, and agricultural industries. Firms in the RER pay a 1.5 percent tax on gross income, relative to a 10-29.5 percent tax on profits for firms in the Régimen MYPE Tributario (RMT) and Régimen General (RG). Firms in the RER are also only required to maintain purchases and sales registers, while firms in the RG are required to also maintain accounting journals, ledgers, inventories, and balance sheets. While not currently analyzed, there are two other tax regimes in Peru that are implemented using thresholds. One is the RMT for firms with annual net income below 1,700 UIT. The second is the Nuevo Régimen Unico Simplificado (NRUS) for firms with total sales below 96,000 soles. Firms in the NRUS play a single flat fee and have no accounting obligations.

12.   Firms have maintained smaller sizes to avoid the application of a profit-sharing legislation, which has resulted in lower productivity. A histogram of firm density by number of employees exhibits a clear discontinuity at 20 employees, the cutoff at which the profit-sharing regulation is applied, indicating that firms have been maintaining smaller sizes. Firms can maintain smaller sizes by limiting expansion or splitting growing firms into multiple smaller firms to avoid the

regulation. This has translated into lower productivity. To estimate the impact on productivity, a local linear regression discontinuity was estimated with the following specification:

$$y_{it} = \beta_1\ 1(employees \leq 20) + \beta_2\ employees + \beta_3\ 1(employees \leq 20) \times employees + \delta_{is} + \theta_t + \varepsilon_{it}$$

Where δ_{is} are industry fixed effects and θ_t are year fixed effects. Because regression discontinuity estimates are only identified within a narrow window around the threshold, the sample was limited to firms between 10 and 30 employees, but the estimates are robust to using other bandwidths. The estimates imply that firms just below 20 employees are about 40 percent less productive than firms just above 20 employees.

Figure 4. Peru: Profit-Sharing Regulation

Sources: EEA and staff calculations.

13.   Special corporate tax regimes have imposed non-linear costs on firms, impacting productivity. The existence of numerous tax regimes for businesses also increases compliance and administrative costs and opportunities for tax arbitrage. Firms with annual sales below 525,000 soles can be in the RER, which allows them to pay a lower tax rate on gross income and have much lower accounting obligations compared to firms in the RMT and RG. A histogram of firm density by annual sales does not indicate that firms have been maintaining a smaller size to remain in the RER. However, the RER has distorted productivity. To estimate the impact on productivity, a local linear regression discontinuity was estimated with the following specification:

$$y_{it} = \beta_1\ 1(sales \leq 525000) + \beta_2\ sales + \beta_3\ 1(sales \leq 525000) \times sales + \delta_{is} + \theta_t + \varepsilon_{it}$$

where δ_{is} are industry fixed effects and θ_t are year fixed effects. Because regression discontinuity estimates are only identified within a narrow window around the threshold, the sample was limited to firms between 325,000 and 725,000 in annual sales, but the estimates are robust to using other bandwidths. Firms just outside the RER are about 40 percent less productive than firms just within the RER.

Figure 5. Peru: Régimen Especial del Impuesto de la Renta

Firm-level log total factor productivity, in 2007 soles

Histogram of firm sales

Sources: EEA and staff calculations.

14.   Reforming policies that impose excessive costs to formalizing or growing a business will be key to boosting productivity. While the high productivity growth between 2002-2013 coincided with the commodity price boom, there was a surge in private investment that was stimulated by significant reforms. These included a revamp of the macroeconomic policy framework (the introduction of inflation targeting and fiscal rules); trade and financial liberalization reforms;

Business Environment Indicators

Levels relative to 2006

Days to obtain permits and licenses
Percent of firms identifying regulations as a major constraint
Percent of firms identifying infrastructure as a major constraint

Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys and staff calculations.

improvements in infrastructure; reforms in healthcare, education, civil service, pensions, and taxes; and development of the mining, agriculture, and tourism sectors (IMF, 2022; Ortiz and Winkelried, 2022; Vostroknutova et al., 2015). The years since have failed to yield comparable reforms. Notably, several business environment indicators – permitting and licensing requirements, tax codes, and labor regulations – have deteriorated since 2006. These counter-reforms should be reversed, and efforts will need to focus on reforming legislations and regulations that impose excessive costs to formalizing or growing a business, which would also reduce regulatory uncertainty and promote investment. As firm-level productivity increases, reforms will also need to ensure that workers can transition to productive sectors of the economy or risk exacerbating the dual economy: an unproductive informal economy coexisting with a highly productive formal economy.

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ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF BUILDING RESILIENCE TO NATURAL HAZARDS AND CLIMATE CHANGE[1]

Peru is the most vulnerable country to climate change among the LA5 group and is highly exposed to periodic El Niño events, which impair production in the country's fishing, agriculture, and construction sectors, as well as inflict sizeable damages to physical assets. Given Peru's low adaptive capacity, climate change will likely increase damages from natural disasters and undermine potential growth in the future. Investments in climate structural resilience and adaptation can unlock substantial potential output gains and fiscal savings for Peru. Complementing these investments with reforms and capacity building to increase public investment efficiency can deliver even greater fiscal benefits.

A. Physical Risks and Policy Gaps

1.   Peru is exposed to multiple climate hazards, including floods, droughts, and storms (Figure 1). Peru experienced 61,708 emergencies linked to natural phenomena between 2003-2019 (World Bank, 2022a). The climate-related physical risk profile of the country is dominated by floods, landslides, droughts, and storms. These natural hazards weigh heavily on socio-economic outcomes and constitute recurring fiscal costs as authorities rebuild damaged infrastructure and support affected populations. For example, economic losses and damages from disasters in 1982-83, 1997-98, and 2017 amounted to 11.6, 6.2, and 1.6 percent of GDP, respectively (World Bank, 2016). Approximately 40 percent of total damages in 2017 were inflicted on the road network (Macroconsult, 2017).

2.   Vulnerability to *El Niño Costero* results in an uneven distribution of physical risks across time, geography, and economic sectors. Peru is particularly exposed to *El Niño Costero*, a recurring warming of the sea surface temperature along its coast (Niño 1+2 region) occurring every 4-5 years.[2] Owing to its complex geography and hydrology, Peru can experience a wide range of impacts from strong El Niño events.[3] In the northern coast, which typically lacks precipitation, heavy rainfall translates into substantial infrastructure damages from floods, lower agricultural yields, and a slowdown in the construction sector. In the southern regions, *El Niño Costero* manifests as a reduction in precipitation that reduces rainfed agriculture's output. Moreover, the rise in the sea

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[2] El *Niño* is a warm phase of the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO), a periodic warming and cooling of waters in the central-to-Eastern Pacific Ocean. In Peru, El Niño events come in two types: Costero and Global. The distinction between the two is based on the region of the Pacific Ocean where the temperature anomaly occurs. El Niño Global increases the likelihood of storms hitting the Peruvian coastline and is associated with significant global spillovers. The cool phase of ENSO is called La Niña.

[3] The strength of *El Niño Costero* is typically classified into weak, moderate, strong, and very strong (extreme) based on the value of the ICEN index (Tahakashi and others, 2014). This annex defines the strong El Niño as strong or very strong Costero event based on the ICEN classification.

surface temperature during *El Niño Costero* adversely affects fish production along Peru's coastline (lower anchovy catches) and associated manufacturing activities (processing of fishmeal and fish oil), while higher air temperatures across the country disrupt flowering and pollination (e.g., blueberries, avocados, mangoes, olives).

3. **Strong to extreme El Niño Costero events typically cause temporary hikes in food and overall price levels, contraction in agricultural output and fish production, as well as a deterioration in the fiscal balance.** While temporary, the effect can be severe and persistent. The sharp drop in fish production (70 percent) and agricultural output (11 percent), as well as the rise in non-core CPI (2.2 p.p.) and non-core food prices (8.1 p.p.), generally takes over a year to recover to pre-El Niño levels. The increase in the core CPI (1 p.p.) and core food prices (2.3 p.p.) in the second year following a strong event, provides evidence of inflation passthrough from non-core price increases. Strong El Nino events can also be fiscally costly, as a sufficiently strong event is likely to decrease public revenues through reductions to tax collections and trigger increased spending on disaster recovery and reconstruction (See section B for details).

4. **In addition, climate change will likely reduce productivity of key economic sectors, such as agriculture and fisheries.** [4] Peru is the most vulnerable country to climate change among the LA5 group and third most vulnerable country in Latin America (IMF-adapted ND-GAIN, 2021).[5] Climate change is expected to undermine the country's natural capital and exacerbate water shortage, likely reducing the stock of fish in the Humboldt current (Salvatteci and others, 2022) and lowering crop yields across the board (World Bank, 2021a). Peru's economy is dependent on these resources as agriculture and fish production jointly constitute 7.6 percent of GDP and employ 28 percent of the workforce (OECD, 2023). Moreover, these sectors represent a notable part of the country's trade with the rest of the world, accounting for over 18 percent of total exports. Overall, climate change could result in large potential output losses in the long run, in the range of -26.2 to -102.3 percent of GDP depending on the global warming scenario (see Section C for details).

5. **Peru's vulnerability to physical risks is exacerbated by the lack of adaptive capacity and low resilience of public infrastructure.** Peru's vulnerability to climate change predominantly reflects one of the lowest adaptive capacities in the region. The wide gap in adaptive capacity relative to LA5 peers, can be attributed to insufficient water management capacity (e.g., dams, water treatment plants), as well as a relatively low quality of infrastructure (e.g., ports, railroads, roads,

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[4] Peru also faces several mitigation challenges from emissions produced by Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF), energy, transport, industry, and agriculture. Unlike most of the world, a large share of these emissions result from deforestation and land use (69% in 2020). Peru also relies heavily on fossil fuels such as natural gas, diesel, and gasoline. Despite the expanding capacity of hydro power, fossil fuels still constitute a large share of electricity generation (36 percent in 2020). The 2020 NDC includes an absolute unconditional target of 208.8 million tons of CO2 equivalent by 2030, approximately equal to a 30 percent reduction from the business-as-usual baseline. This ambition heavily relies on slowing down the rate of deforestation as well as rolling out a carbon tax. The 2023 Article IV Staff Report (Annex XI) provides several examples of how these policy measures can be combined with revenue recycling to produce a net benefit for the Peruvian economy.

[5] IMF-adapted ND-GAIN defines vulnerability to climate change as a combination of exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity. Although Peru's ecosystem is less exposed to the impacts of climate change compared to the LA5 average, the country's economy is more sensitive to its adverse effects. Finally, the adaptive capacity of the country is much lower than the LA5 average.

information technology). [6] Moreover, potential for improving adaptive capacity is undermined by weak public investment management, lack of coordination between various levels of government, and capacity gaps in the civil service.[7] In combination with a chronic under-execution of capital budgets, these reasons also represent a major obstacle to effective investments in structural resilience (Figure 2).

Figure 1. Peru: Natural Disaster Profile and El Niño

Peru's physical risk profile is dominated by floods, landslides, storms, and droughts with an uneven distribution of risk across time, due to the presence of the El Niño phenomenon, and across geography, due to the country's asymmetric temperature and precipitation profiles.

Distribution of Physical Risk by Disaster Type
(Percent)

Economic Losses During El Nino Costero Years
(Index, average annual losses =100)

Temperature Profile
(Units,°C)

Precipitation Profile
(Units, mm/year)

Sources: IMF staff calculations, UNDRR DesInventar database, NOAA (2024), Massetti and Tagklis (2023) and Harris et al. (2020).
Notes: DesInventar database includes disasters that occurred in Peru from 1970 to 2013. Precipitation and temperature profiles based on an average annual climatology for 1990-2021.

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[6] Peru has one of the most unevenly distributed infrastructure networks in Latin America (World Bank, 2022b).

[7] OECD (2023) identifies weak public investment management, lack of coordination between various levels of government, and capacity gaps in the civil service as main causes for low public investment efficiency in Peru.

Figure 2. Peru: Climate Change Risks

Global warming will likely increase average temperature nationwide and cause higher precipitation in areas already vulnerable to floods.

Temperature Change in 2070 (SSP2-4.5)
(Percent, relative to 1986-2014 average)

Precipitation Change in 2070 (SSP2-4.5)
(Percent, relative to 1986-2014 average)

Although Peru's ecosystem is less exposed to climate change than some LA5 countries, the adaptive capacity of the country is one of the lowest in the region due to insufficient water storage capacity and low quality of trade and transport infrastructure, making it the most vulnerable in LA5.

Adaptive Capacity and Exposure

Adaptive Capacity by Life-supporting Sector

Sources: IMF staff calculations, IMF-adapted ND-GAIN, Massetti and Tagklis (2023) and Harris et al. (2020).
Notes: Average annual temperature anomaly between a 30-year time period centered around 2070, relative to 1986-2014.
Adaptive capacity index is the difference between one and the capacity indicator so that higher values indicate greater capacity.
Bubble size indicates per-capita GDP in USD (2019).

6.   Authorities have created a framework for climate adaptation, but current implementation remains well below ambition. Peru has established a legal framework and committed to a comprehensive roadmap to enable climate adaptation. The 2018 *Framework Law on Climate Change* sets a legal basis for integrating public adaptation principles into strategic national planning and territorial planning, as well as for integrating climate change risks in the public investment management process. Furthermore, it requires the Ministry of Environment (MINAM), in coordination with various line ministries, to provide annual progress reports to Congress. The 2021

National Adaptation Plan (NAP) outlines the country's sectoral adaptation priorities across 5 key thematic areas (Health, Water, Agriculture, Aquaculture, and Forests).[8] It details 84 associated adaptation measures scheduled for completion by 2030.[9] As of July 2023, implementation has commenced for 33 out of 84 measures included in the NAP, 18 of which are concentrated in the water thematic area.[10] However, despite the progress, annual expenditure on adaptation remains significantly below identified needs and does not align well with the targets set in the NAP. If the current annual adaptation expenditure level of $0.6 billion (as of 2023) is maintained, it would take approximately 20 years more (until 2052) to implement costed adaptation plans originally set for 2030 (Figure 3).

Figure 3. Peru: Remaining Adaptation Needs
(USD, billions)

Sources: IMF staff calculation, MINAM (2021b), MEF (2024).
Notes: Business as Usual (BAU) projections assume annual adaptation expenditure at the 2023 level: $0.6 billion in nominal terms and 0.2 percent as a share of GDP.

7.   Despite important steps to strengthen structural protection, the progress remains slow. Peru established the *National Framework for Disaster Risk Management* (SINAGERD) in 2011. Within this framework, 2021 marked the release of the *National Disaster Risk Management Policy by 2050* and an updated *National Plan for Disaster Risk Management* (PLANAGERD 2022-2030). The national Disaster Risk Management (DRM) plan includes 21 strategic actions aimed at enhancing capacity and access to knowledge, incorporating DRM into operational and territorial planning, incorporating DRM principles into the public investment management process, and climate-

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[8] MINAM currently works on expanding the thematic coverage of the national adaptation plans by including two additional thematic areas, Transport and Tourism, as well as the associated adaptation measures.

[9] The Ministry of Environment (MINAM) devised an ambitious set of adaptation measures aimed at safeguarding critical sectors like agriculture and fisheries. These measures involve enhancing water management capacity, implementing early warning systems, strengthening risk transfer systems, and investing in essential infrastructure. Additionally, these measures encompass diversification of vulnerable primary economic activities and adoption of preventive measures in agriculture and fisheries.

[10] Assessing the progress in adaptation efforts over the last three years presents a challenge due to the recent revisions of the methodology for classifying progress with the adaptation measures by MINAM. These revisions were aimed at homogenizing the definitions of progress across the five thematic areas, as declared by the responsible ministries.

proofing public infrastructure.[11] Under the umbrella of this strategy, the Ministry of Transport and Communications (MTC) constructs new bridges with adequate provisions in areas exposed to riverine floods, provides maintenance to prepare the road infrastructure for upcoming *El Niño* events and reconstructs them ex-post.[12] Established in 2023, the National Infrastructure Agency (ANIN) will take over a fraction of infrastructure projects from subnational governments, aiming to strengthen structural resilience of public assets (e.g., schools, reinforced riverbeds) by adopting international engineering standards and focusing on disaster risk management in construction planning. Nonetheless, natural disasters still inflict sizeable damages to public infrastructure as resources are often diverted towards other development objectives.[13]

8.   Peru's government has implemented a disaster risk retention system, which now requires a thorough assessment of its financial buffers. In 2016, the World Bank and the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) developed the 2016 *Comprehensive Strategy for Financial Protection against Natural Disasters*. This strategy envisages a multi-layered approach to centralized financing of expenses relating to major emergencies (levels 4 and 5), comprising of a risk retention (fiscal stabilization fund, contingency credit lines, and reserves) and risk transfer components (indemnity insurance and cat-bonds).[14] By 2024, all elements of the strategy's risk retention component were operational and had been utilized in managing recent natural disasters. However, the adequacy of these financial safeguards had not been assessed against a wider set of potential natural hazard risks, as currently only earthquake risk is included.

9.   Significant financial protection gaps remain in the country's risk transfer system which stands to gain from further improvement. While insuring public assets is mandatory, it is subject to the availability of funds. The absence of a centralized inventory of public assets complicates the monitoring of public sector insurance coverage.[15] Furthermore, the progress with adopting nontraditional insurance instruments has stalled since the 2018 Pacific Alliance issuance of cat-bonds linked to earthquake risk. Catastrophe insurance penetration in the private sector remains low, with only 8 percent of properties insured against natural disasters as of 2017.[16] Authorities need

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[11] Its predecessor (PLANAGERD 2014-2021) oversaw capacity and resilience building enhancements. For example, approximately half of regional governments implemented Early Warning Systems for natural disasters between 2014 and 2021 (MINAM 2021a). However, some strategic actions, notably the integration of disaster risk management into territorial planning and zoning regulations, showed a lack of progress.

[12] MTC also provides material support (e.g., fuel) to subnational governments to assist in the preparation to upcoming *El Niño* events as well as in post-disaster response.

[13] For example, the goal of enhancing structural resilience of the national road infrastructure conflicts with the goal of eliminating unpaved national roads. The share of unpaved national roads fell from 46.4 percent in 2011 to approximately 20 percent in 2023. Facing limited resources, the government often compromises between various development objectives.

[14] Local and regional budgets are expected to rely on their institutional budgets in responding to emergency levels 1, 2, and 3. Peru's Fiscal Stabilization Fund is not climate specific.

[15] The existing system requires that each public entity individually insures its managed assets. Creating a centralized inventory of public assets could enable the government to collectively negotiate insurance coverage, thereby achieving savings by consolidating the various indemnity insurances into a single policy.

[16] Among insured properties, insurance policies often exclude flood risk.

to be conscious that a significant share of uninsured public and private assets represents an implicit contingent liability for the government, which could overwhelm the risk retention system if a tail risk materializes.

B. Estimating the Impact of El Niño on Economic Activity

10.   Peru's vulnerability to *El Niño* transcends damages to physical assets, also reflecting temporary deterioration in natural capital and productivity. *El Niño* events are often associated with significant damages to private and public capital, which are documented through data on economic losses in major disaster databases (e.g., EM-DAT and DesInventar). However, these events also tend to influence the stock of natural capital and productivity of some economic activities (e.g., agriculture and construction), channels that are not accounted for in such databases. This section aims to quantify the broader range of channels through which *El Niño* affects Peru's economy by estimating the magnitude of impact on sectoral output, prices, and fiscal outcomes.

11.   The local projection method proposed by Jordà (2005) is used to estimate impulse response functions for strong *El Niño* events. The impact of an average strong *El Niño Costero* shock is estimated for a 1–2-year horizon using the equation below:

$$\Delta y_{t+h|t-1} = \beta_0^h + \beta_1^h s_t^{EN} + \sum_{i=1}^{4} \beta_2^i \, \Delta y_{t-i} + x_{t-1} + v_t^h$$

where β_0 is the constant term, s_t^{EN} is a binary variable equal to one during the onset of an *El Niño Costero*, $\sum_{i=1}^{4} \beta_2^i \, \Delta y_{t-i}$ includes the lags of the dependent variable, and x_{t-1} includes a set of control variables, such as oil price indices for Peru's main oil import partners (U.S. and Nigeria), a global fertilizer index, and a local production index for the regressions on monthly prices. The model is estimated on quarterly data for sectoral output and monthly data for the price indices.[17]

12.   The empirical analysis in this section indicates that strong *El Niño* events have historically been associated with inflationary pressures. Both core and headline inflation rates rose following strong *El Niño Costero* events. Non-core inflation increased immediately after the shock, reaching a 4.4 percentage point increase in the year over year inflation rate by the end of the first year, then gradually declining and entering a period of deflation as prices normalize to pre-*El Niño* levels. Core inflation, on the other hand, only started rising about 12 months after the shock, suggesting a possible passthrough from headline to core (Figure 4).

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[17] For quarterly dependent variables the production index is omitted.

Figure 4. Peru: Change in Inflation Indicators Following El Niño Shock

Strong/very strong El Niño Costero events were followed by an increase in y/y inflation during the first year and core inflation during the second year, with associated increases in food (non-core and core) inflation.

Monthly Inflation Increase After El Nino Costero
(Y/y, Percent)

Monthly Food Inflation After El Nino Costero
(Y/y, Percent)

Sources: IMF staff calculations.
Notes: Shaded areas show the 68 percent confidence interval. "t+x" corresponds to x quarters after the onset of *El Niño Costero*.

13.   One of the primary channels of *El Niño*'s impact on inflation works through food prices. The increase in the non-core food inflation, which tracks price fluctuations of perishable foods like fresh fruit and vegetables, closely mirrored the path of the headline rate but with a significantly larger magnitude. Non-core food inflation registered an 8.1 percentage point (p.p.) increase by the end of the first year. Core food prices, being less sensitive to weather extremes, only picked up in the second year, registering a 2.3 p.p. increase in the inflation rate 20 months after the onset of *El Niño Costero*. In line with these results, the ongoing 2023 *El Niño Costero* triggered temporary spikes in year over year CPI inflation for the Fish and Seafood component, 11 p.p. increase between February and June, and the Fruits component, 22.6 p.p. increase between February and September.

14.   Within a year of the onset of a strong *El Niño Costero* event, both fish production and agricultural output experience a sharp decline. In the past, the output of fisheries dropped by 70 percent within the first year since the onset of *El Niño*, on average, quickly followed by a recovery to pre-*El Niño* levels as the normalization of sea surface temperature restored availability of fish in the Humboldt current. Agricultural output dropped by about 11 percent within the same time span, followed by a more gradual recovery. Historically, the impact on agriculture was more persistent with production still about 3.4 percent below pre-*El Niño* levels 1.5 years after the shock. The ongoing *El Niño Costero* episode, which reached the "strong" classification in April 2023, has disrupted two fishing seasons, lowered agricultural yields, and reduced construction and manufacturing activity. In March-November 2023, fishing and agriculture output was 27.3 and 4.9 percent below trend. Construction and manufacturing output were 9.2 and 6.6 percent lower, respectively.

15.   Strong *El Niño* events typically last slightly longer than a year, influencing other weather-related anomalies and contributing to reductions in the primary balance. Accounting for the spillovers into the manufacturing sector, as well as the impact on construction and mining, *El Niño Costero* events typically reduced real GDP by 5 percentage points within the first year, relative to a baseline real GDP trajectory. An offsetting factor during *El Niño* events was usually an increase in public expenditure to rebuild infrastructure and support affected populations. The central government's primary balance would typically fall by about 2 percent of GDP for the same period, reflecting increased expenditures and lower collections. Consistent with the staff estimates, the annual central government primary balance fell by around 1.2 percent of GDP from 2022 to 2023, reflecting about half a percentage point increase in nominal primary expenditures and 6 percent lower nominal revenues during a strong *El Niño Costero* year.

Figure 5. Peru: Change in Sectoral Output and Primary Balance Following an El Niño Shock

Strong/very strong El Niño Costero events caused sizeable contractions in sectors such as fisheries and agriculture...

Fish Production
(Percent, relative to no El Nino)

Agricultural Production
(Percent, relative to no El Nino)

... as well as reductions in the primary balance. Elevated sea surface temperatures persisted for slightly over a year.

Primary Balance
(Percent of GDP, relative to no El Nino)

ONI 12 Index
(Degrees Celsius, relative to no El Nino)

Sources: IMF staff calculations
Notes: Shaded areas show the 68 percent confidence interval. "t+x" corresponds to x quarters after the onset of *El Niño Costero*.

C. Measuring Economic Benefits of Building Resilience and Adapting to Climate Change

16. The IMF's climate FGG DSGE model is used to quantify the long-term impact of natural disasters and climate change on the economy of Peru and illustrate the benefits of investing in adaptation and resilience ex-ante. The FGG model (Fernandez-Corugedo, Gonzalez, and Guerson, 2023) is a Markov-switching dynamic small open economy model designed to evaluate the macroeconomic returns of investment in resilience to natural disasters and climate change. The model assumes that the economy oscillates between two states: one in which a natural disaster shock materializes and the other in which the economy is not affected by such shocks. The key assumption in the model is that there are two types of public capital: standard capital and resilient capital. Standard capital is vulnerable to natural disasters, and part of it is destroyed each time the economy enters a "disaster" regime. Resilient capital is immune to disasters and is not affected by regime shifts. Both types are used as an input to production by firms, jointly with private capital and labor.

17. The FGG model is extended to account for the impact of *El Niño* on natural capital and the role of public investment efficiency in determining macro-fiscal outcomes. Following Gallic and Vermandel (2020), the baseline model is extended to include the natural capital in the production function:

$$Y_t^H = [\theta(s)K_{t-1}^N]^\omega [z_t^Y (K_{t-1}^G)^{\alpha_G} (N_t)^{\alpha_k} (K_{t-1}^Y)^{1-\alpha_k}]^{1-\omega}$$

where $\theta(s)$ is the parameter capturing the impact of natural disasters on natural capital, K_{t-1}^N is the stock of natural capital, z_t^Y is productivity, K_{t-1}^G is the stock of public capital, N_t is the labor input, and K_{t-1}^Y is the stock of private physical capital. The elasticity of output to various production inputs are captured by the respective parameters (ω, α_G. α_K). Finally, only a fraction of public investment is assumed to transform into productive public capital, capturing possible inefficiencies in public investment management (Buffie et al. 2012):

$$K_t^G = (1 - \delta(s))K_{t-1}^G + (1 - \epsilon)I_t^G$$

where I_t^G is government investment, $\delta(s)$ is the depreciation rate, and ϵ is the inefficiency parameter. (s) denotes parameters changing value between states. In this setup, the Markov-switching model has two states: the one in which natural disasters inflict modest damages and the other in which damages and losses from natural disasters are amplified by the presence of *El Nino Costero*.[18] Natural disasters inflict damages to physical assets, as in the conventional FGG setup, but also to the

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[18] A key distinction between the traditional use of the FGG model for small island states prone to tropical cyclones and its current application to a large emerging economy like Peru is the frequency and scale of natural disasters. While Peru faces natural disasters on an annual basis, the average impact of each event is smaller, yet more frequent, compared to those typically modeled for small island states. Therefore, even during what would be considered the "normal" regime, some level of damage from natural disasters is anticipated in Peru.

country's stock of natural capital.[19] Furthermore, the total stock of public capital now includes adaptation capital which reduces the impact of weather on natural capital by changing $\theta(s)$.

18.   Recurring natural hazards already take a heavy toll on Peru's economy, while the losses are expected to amplify with climate change. Peru is affected by repeated natural disasters without being able to fully return to the initial level of capital and productivity. In other words, the effects of sequences of shocks accumulate over time, weighing permanently on macroeconomic outcomes.[20] In the case of Peru, staff's illustrative analysis captures a wide array of climate hazards, including floods, droughts, storms, landslides, and the weak upwelling that reduces fishing yields. The model simulations illustrate that existing climate hazards already undermine the country's economy, reducing potential output by 4.1 percent in 2023, relative to the no climate counterfactual. Moreover, the anticipated effects of climate change will likely amplify these losses. Cai and others (2021) argue that ENSO-related rainfall in the equatorial Pacific will intensify and move eastward.

19.   Temperature anomalies undermine future potential growth, but market agents are allowed to adapt over the long run.[21] To account for the possible impacts of climate change, we compute projections of potential output until 2100 under three global warming scenarios: Delayed Net Zero (SSP1-2.6), Intermediate GHG emissions (SSP2-4.5), and Hothouse world (SSP3-7.0). Potential output paths are given by:

$$Y_t^{potential,i} = Y^{SS,i} \times T_t^i$$

where T_t^i is a measure of long run trend which produces the balanced growth path of output when multiplied by the steady-state output level $Y^{SS,i}$. The growth rate of potential output is decreasing in the size of the temperature anomaly $T_t^i - T^{*,i}$ under the three global warming scenarios obtained from Massetti and Tagklis (2023), with the magnitude of the impact governed by elasticities β_1 and β_2 taken from Chirinos (2021):

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[19] The impact of strong/very strong El Niño shocks on physical capital is set to 2.6 percent of the capital stock per quarter; calibrated by averaging damages for select severe events available from World Bank (2016, 2021a). The impact on natural capital is set to match empirical estimates from the previous section. Weak and moderate El Niño shocks are assumed to inflict ¼ of damages and losses resulting from a strong/very strong event. The impact of other natural disasters (unrelated to El Niño) is calibrated by dividing the average El Niño impact by 3.13 (implied by the difference in real asset losses between El Niño Costero years and the rest of the sample declared in DesInventar database). The transition probabilities are calibrated using the history of El Niño occurrences since 1980.

[20] See Cantelmo, Melina, and Papageorgiou (2019), Melina and Santoro (2021), or Fernandez-Corugedo, Gonzalez-Gomez, and Guerson (2023) for detailed discussions of the long-run output losses from recurring climate shocks.

[21] Several limitations of this approach warrant attention. Firstly, the construction of temperature anomalies leverages median temperature projections from the climate models, disregarding the model uncertainty associated with such projections. Secondly, the elasticities derived from Chirinos (2021) are backward looking by construction, and their application to future projections implicitly assumes no changes in the pace of technological progress, natural adaptive capacities, or shifts in market behavior due to policy interventions. Thirdly, the method employs conservative estimates from Chirinos (2021) to assess the impact of global warming on potential growth, using parameters β_1 and β_2 based on absolute temperature deviations and regional GDP weighted by population. The approach does not account for the uncertainty surrounding these estimated elasticities, as they are not detailed by the authors in their publication.

$$\frac{T_t^i}{T_{t-1}^i} = 1 + g^{SS} - (\beta_1 + \beta_2) \times \left(T_t^i - T^{*,i}\right)$$

where g^{SS} is the long run growth under no climate impacts, while i denotes the climate change scenario. $T^{*,i}$ is the baseline climate profile calculated using a 30-year rolling average of temperature. This modelling choice is crucial as it produces smaller temperature anomalies that tend to gravitate to zero if global warming slows down over time. The underlying rationale for this choice is the belief that economic agents will autonomously adapt to increments of global warming that took place in the distant past. Additionally, the hothouse world scenario (SSP3-7.0) assumes a 59 percent rise in the number of strong *El Niño* events by the second half of the century.[22]

20.   Potential output losses from climate change increase over time but depend on the assumed progress with the global mitigation effort. Combining the additional impact of climate change with the existing losses from climate, potential output could be up to 16.1-22.8 percent lower by 2050 and 28.2-102.3 percent lower by 2100, relative to the no climate change counterfactual (Figure 6). This is equivalent to a 0.1-0.3 percentage point reduction in the average annual potential growth rate due to climate and climate change. In all scenarios except for the hothouse world, losses in potential growth are front-loaded. This is because the rate of global warming is anticipated to decelerate in the future under the SSP1-2.6 and SSP2-4.5 (Figure 6).

21.   Investments in adaptation and structural resilience combined with increased public investment efficiency deliver sizable output gains in the long-term. Investing in resilience and adaptation offsets the impact of natural hazards and climate change on productive factors and growth. Structural resilience involves making public infrastructure, like roads, bridges, and schools, climate-proof, effectively representing a shift from standard to resilient capital. Adaptation investments cover expenditures on knowledge systems, irrigation and water management, and diversification of crops and livestock, among other items.[23] Within the model, these investments reduce the impact of natural disasters on natural capital and partially offset the reduction in the long run growth rate due to positive temperature anomalies.[24] According to the model simulations, a policy package that includes: (a) 0.8 percent of GDP in public adaptation investments per year until 2030; (b) climate proofing 80 percent of Peru's transport infrastructure; and (c) increasing public investment efficiency by 5 percentage points can produce potential output gains as high as 9.3-12.3

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[22] Important limitation of our approach is that Cai and others (2014) simulate the increase in El Nino intensity under RCP8.5, whereas we assume this increase under a less severe global warming scenario, SSP3-7.0. Therefore, our approach likely overestimates the cost of climate change for SSP3-7.0 global warming scenario.

[23] Adaptation investments include expenses on pest management, resistant genetic resources, agricultural risk transfer systems, crop and livestock diversification, cultivated pasture conservation, soil erosion management and control technologies, soil fertilization, water supply and sanitation, multipurpose water storage, supporting technified irrigation, drainage systems, adapting landing sites for artisanal fishing, strengthening early warning systems, aquaculture management, among others.

[24] Results are based on a conservative view on the benefits from adaptation, which are typically associated with large uncertainties. The baseline scenarios consider that investments in adaptation will offset 1/3 of the climate's impact on natural capital and productivity.

percent by 2050 and 12.4-31 percent by 2100 (Figure 7).[25] The policy package does not totally eliminate the projected decline in potential output due to climate impacts. Residual output losses still amount to 6.8-10.5 percent by 2050 and 15.8-71.3 percent by 2100. However, the proposed policy package is cost-effective under all three global warming scenarios since it simultaneously lifts the potential output trajectory and produces fiscal savings.

Figure 6. Peru: Potential Output Losses and Climate Change

Potential output losses will rise over time under all climate change scenarios as rising temperature undermines growth. However, the long-term growth outlook is expected to improve in scenarios where global emissions are reduced and the rate of temperature increase in Peru slows down.

The gradual recovery in the potential growth rate under SSP1-2.6 and SSP2-4.5 results from the reduction in the pace of warming and the associated reduction in temperature anomalies.

Sources: IMF staff calculations using the FGG model, Massetti and Tagklis (2023), Harris et al. (2020), and Chirinos (2021); Riahi et. Al.,The Shared Socioeconomic Pathways and their energy, land use, and greenhouse gas emissions implications: An overview, Global Environmental Change, Volume 42 (2017).

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[25] It is worth noting that these results are not driven by the increase in the public investment efficiency, as it only accounts for a 0.8 percent positive shift in the potential GDP trajectory.

Figure 7. Peru: Potential Output Gains from Building Resilience and Adapting to Climate Change

Investing in adaptation and resilience, along with implementing reforms to enhance the efficiency of public investment, can yield significant output gains across all global warming scenarios, compensating for a good amount of the output losses from climate change.

Sources: IMF staff calculation using the FGG model, Massetti and Tagklis (2023), Harris et al. (2020), and Chirinos (2021); Riahi et. Al.,The Shared Socioeconomic Pathways and their energy, land use, and greenhouse gas emissions implications: An overview, Global Environmental Change, Volume 42 (2017).

22.   Public investments in adaptation and resilience are also associated with large fiscal returns. Making public infrastructure resilient to *El Niño* and other natural disasters leads to fiscal savings by preventing the need to repeatedly reconstruct damaged roads and bridges, as well as by mitigating the transitory reduction in government revenues associated with these events. Investments in adaptation partially offset the impact of global warming on the potential growth rate, thereby producing a higher trajectory for the tax base and tax receipts. Between 2024 and 2100, the combined benefits produce, on average, an annual 2.3-4.6 percent of GDP in fiscal savings. However, the fiscal benefits materialize over time, whereas fiscal costs are immediate. To account for this discrepancy, discounted fiscal savings must be calculated. Table 1 clearly demonstrates that investments in adaptation and structural resilience are cost-effective under all three global warming

scenarios even when accounting for the time value of money and under a range of discount rates (Figure 8).

23.   Authorities should also consider improving coordination within the government, enhancing financial resilience, and enforcing stricter DRM-linked zoning regulations. The effectiveness of public efforts in adaptation and disaster risk management could be enhanced through improved coordination among various levels and branches of the government. For instance, the MEF could estimate the costs of measures outlined in the national adaptation and DRM plans—a first step towards effective budgeting of climate policies—or adopt green budget tagging. In terms of financial protection, authorities should generate a comprehensive framework for quantification of fiscal risks that includes all major natural hazards. Furthermore, authorities should focus on ensuring comprehensive insurance coverage for public assets and fostering development of a disaster insurance market. Enhancing insurance uptake by the private sector can diminish macroeconomic volatility and mitigate contingent risks for the public sector. Finally, Peru requires a robust and holistic strategy for territorial planning that includes DRM considerations. It is imperative for subnational governments to diligently enforce zoning regulations. Without such enforcement, physical assets of the most-at-risk communities (e.g., rural, low-income) will remain exposed to future natural hazards.

Table 1. Peru: Cumulative Discounted Fiscal Savings from Investment in Resilience and Adaptation
(Present value, in percent of 2023 GDP) [1] [2]

		SSP1-2.6		SSP2-4.5		SSP3-7.0	
		2050	2100	2050	2100	2050	2100
Total Return (a)		**120.25**	**262.36**	**122.34**	**286.80**	**143.05**	**336.35**
Stock saving	Decrease in reconstruction cost after NDs	4.53	6.84	4.71	6.89	4.78	6.96
Flow saving	Moderation of tax base decline after NDs	16.28	31.00	16.58	33.92	19.52	39.97
Potential growth	Increase in the tax base trajectory	99.43	224.52	101.04	245.99	118.75	289.42
Total Cost (b) 3/		**10.53**	**11.65**				
Adaptation	Investments in Water, Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries	4.84	4.92				
Resilience	Investment to climate proof and maintain transport infrastructure	5.69	6.73				
Net annual saving (a) - (b)		**109.72**	**250.71**	**111.81**	**275.15**	**132.52**	**324.70**

Sources: Fund staff calculations using FGG model, Massetti and Tagklis (2023), Harris et al. (2020), and Chirinos (2021).
1/ Assumes government implements measures specified in the NAP and increases investment in resilient infrastructure to reduce damages by climate-related natural disasters to 20 percent, while maintaining historical investment rates. Present values are calculated using projections up to 2100.
2/ The discount rate is set to 6 percent.
3/ The cost of adaptation and resilience is constant and does not depend on the global warming scenario.

Figure 8. Fiscal Savings from Building Resilience and Adapting to Climate Change

Average Fiscal Savings from Investment in Resilience and Adaptation
(Percent of GDP)

- Hothouse world (SSP3-7.0)
- Intermediate GHG emissions (SSP2-4.5)
- Delayed Net Zero (SSP1-2.6)

2024-2050: 1.60, 1.29, 1.21
2024-2100: 4.60, 3.21, 2.29

Cumulative Discounted Fiscal Savings by 2100 under Alternative Discount Rates
(Present value, in percent of 2023 GDP)

- Resilience
- Adaptation

5%: SSP1-2.6, SSP2-4.5, SSP3-7.0
6% (Baseline): SSP1-2.6, SSP2-4.5, SSP3-7.0
7%: SSP1-2.6, SSP2-4.5, SSP3-7.0
10%: SSP1-2.6, SSP2-4.5, SSP3-7.0

Sources: IMF staff calculation using the FGG model, Massetti and Tagklis (2023), Harris et al. (2020), and Chirinos (2021).

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PRODUCTIVITY, DIGITALIZATION, AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN PERU[1]

Peru has been diverging from advanced economies due to sluggish productivity growth. While multiple factors contributed to it, constrained technology and knowledge diffusion is one of them. Addressing these barriers could unlock the considerable potential of the digital revolution, including digital technologies and artificial intelligence (AI),[2] and boost productivity primarily in the formal sector, especially in the financial, government, education, health, IT, trade, and real estate sectors. Current advancements in the use of technology within the financial sector (FinTech) and the government sector (GovTech) are steps in the right direction.

## A. Technology Diffusion and Access to Digital Services

1. **Multiple factors may have contributed to Peru's low productivity, but the limited diffusion of knowledge and technology is one of the challenges.** Key factors for the low diffusion of technology include weak competition, constrained access to finance, the proliferation of small firms, low R&D investment, and inadequate human capital. Lags in the introduction of technology and the intensity of its use can explain part of the differences in output and productivity growth between Peru and advanced economies, or more rapidly growing emerging markets in Eastern Europe and Asia (Comin and Mestieri, 2018). More recently, in contrast to Peru, the countries that led in adopting information technologies in the 1980s also experienced higher labor productivity over the following twenty years.

2. **Peru has been lagging advanced economies in adopting digital technologies.** Initially, during the early stages of the digital revolution, Peru was slower in embracing personal computers and the internet, compared to frontier economies. This delay is illustrated by the horizontal gap in the first four charts of Figure 1, indicating a later introduction of these technologies. Additionally, the vertical gap in the charts highlights the less intensive use of these technologies within Peru's economy. Currently, Peru's access to the internet is lower than in other LA5 economies, with some regions and parts of the society being largely excluded from the digital world.

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[1] Prepared by Dmitry Vasilyev (WHD) and Brooks Evans (FAD). Sophia Chen (WHD) prepared diffusion charts (Figure 1) and made key contributions to work on growth simulations (Figure 2). The part on technology diffusion and artificial intelligence relied on the upcoming WHD working paper on AI and productivity in Latin America and the Caribbean.

[2] Artificial Intelligence (AI) is the development of computer systems that can perform tasks typically requiring human intelligence, such as learning, problem-solving, perception, decision-making, and language understanding.

Figure 1. Peru: The Diffusion of Information Technology and Access to the Internet

Sources: Cross-country Historical Adoption of Technology (CHAT); Statista; Haver Analytics, based on EPFR Global; and IMF staff calculations.

3. **Peru is actively working to bridge the digital divide and modernize its economy through digital transformation.** The government has made significant progress in digitizing its revenue administration at the central level, as evidenced by its classification in the "very high" group of the United Nations' E-Government Development Index in 2022. Key policy enablers are in place, including access to digital IDs and a law for digital government that facilitates the use of digital technologies across various government levels. The National Policy of Digital Transformation for 2023-2030 aims to increase the proportion of adults using digital technologies for accessing services or information from about 52 percent to 85 percent by 2030. The National Policy also seeks to enhance access to FinTech, GovTech, and e-commerce services. Through these efforts, the authorities aim to address the issue of low digitalization, which they recognize as a significant factor contributing to inefficiencies in firms.

16. **To achieve these objectives, Peru is collaborating with multilateral donors.** The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the World Bank are leading initiatives to connect 3.5 million students and train over 265,000 teachers in digital skills.[3] Additionally, the IDB is aiding in GovTech reforms. These comprehensive changes aim to significantly improve digital engagement and efficiency in Peru's economy and society.

B. Artificial Intelligence

17. **The rapid advancements of new technology—AI—risks widening the gap between Peru and advanced economies, unless obstacles to technology diffusion are addressed.** In Peru, the labor force's exposure to AI is low compared to advanced economies and lower than in other LA5 countries (Figure 2).[4] Approximately 30 percent of the labor force in Peru is highly exposed to AI, indicating AI's capability to perform many tasks in this group. In contrast, over 60 percent of the labor force in the U.S. and the UK are highly exposed to AI. Such exposure is crucial as it motivates businesses to integrate AI, enhancing labor productivity. Conversely, limited AI exposure in Peru could lead to even lower technology adoption compared to past trends.

18. **At the same time, AI presents an opportunity to increase productivity, particularly in the formal economy, potentially drawing workers from informal employment.** In Peru's formal economy, the level of AI exposure and its complementarity are on par with those in advanced economies (Figure 2). Given this, larger formal businesses have more opportunities to use AI to boost productivity. As the formal economy grows, a larger workforce will be required, potentially attracting workers from informal sectors. Employment in the formal economy is likely to increase in sectors with high AI complementarity. Additionally, higher aggregate productivity may boost earnings and stimulate demand for labor in other sectors (Autor, 2015). If policies successfully facilitate this transition, Peru will be well-positioned to converge with advanced economies. These

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[3] https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2023/10/30/world-bank-idb-digital-transformation-education-latin-america-caribbean

[4] The AI occupational exposure and complementarity indexes measure AI's potential to substitute or complement labor in each occupation (Pizzinelli et al., 2023). The aggregated level of AI exposure and complementarity is calculated using these indexes and Peru's 2022 household survey ENAHO.

policies should aim to enhance access to higher-quality education and address labor and tax regulations that incur costs for formalization.

Figure 2. Peru: Labor Force Complementarity and Exposure to AI

Sources: ILO; Peru ENAHO; Pizzinelli et al. (2023); IMF staff calculations.

19.   By enhancing knowledge and technology diffusion, Peru could fully leverage advancements in AI and other digital technologies. Should Peru succeed in halving its technological and AI exposure gap with the U.S., it would move towards economic convergence with the U.S., as depicted in the optimistic scenario in Figure 3. Achieving this reduction in the technological gap will require major structural reforms aimed at improving the business environment, fostering competition, expanding access to finance, and developing human capital. According to this scenario, efforts to narrow the technological divide are expected to commence in 2028. Without such reforms, the gap in AI exposure may widen, further exacerbating the

technological divide. Consequently, the disparity between Peru and the U.S. would only increase, as shown in the pessimistic scenario in Figure 3. The annual average difference in GDP growth between these two scenarios from 2040 to 2050 is projected to be 0.21 percentage points. These simulations are based on the Comin and Mestieri (2018) model of technology adoption and growth with parameters calibrated to reflect the delays in technology introduction and the intensity of its use in Latin America vis-à-vis the U.S. For further details on this model and its application to Latin America, see Bakker et al. (2024).

Figure 3. Peru: Growth Simulations

Optimistic Scenario...

Pessimistic scenario...

Note: Simulations are based on Comin and Mestieri (2018); see Bakker et al. (2024) for further discussion.

20.   Narrowing the technology gap is withinreach. For Peru to halve its AI exposure gap with the U.S., it needs to reach the average level of AI exposure observed in other major Latin American countries, as illustrated in Figure 2. This advancement would coincide with a reduction in informality towards the average levels seen in these countries. By narrowing the technological gap, Peru would align with the standards of more technologically advanced middle-income nations, as depicted in the Atlas of Economic Complexity (text Figure). The Atlas growth simulations based on the economic complexity index show that this

reduction in the technological gap would increase Peru's long-term growth by 1.1 percent. Additionally, the technology import index—an indicator of technological diffusion—has already shown significant growth in Peru since 2010 to the average levels of Chile, Colombia, and Brazil (Cugat and Manera, 2024).

21.   The sectors that stand to gain the most from AI, in terms of enhancing productivity, include finance, government, trade, IT, education, health, and real estate. Over 50 percent of the workforce in these sectors is significantly exposed to AI (Figure 4). AI is also complementary for a substantial share of the workforce in these sectors. This suggests that many employees in these sectors could integrate AI into their work to augment their existing skills and increase their productivity. AI automation in healthcare and education could enhance the quality-to-price ratio, prices could decline, and new and improved services could emerge leading to the expansion of these sectors.

Economic Complexity and Growth

■ Growth Projections (annual growth in percent until 2031)
● Index of Economic Complexity (RHS)

Sources: The Atlas of Economic Complexity; IMF staff.
Note: The average reflects the complexity index for countries ranked between the 45th and 55th percentiles of the distribution, with Peru representing the minimum index value and the USA representing the maximum.
For Growth Projections, the Atlas uses four key factors: Economic Complexity Index, Complexity Outlook Index, current income level, and forecasted growth in per capita natural resource exports.

22.   The digitalization of these sectors is a crucial prerequisite for implementing AI technologies. Examples from specific sectors highlight the current potential for AI application. For instance, a fully digitalized national tax system and GovTech platforms are revealing opportunities for AI utilization within the government sector. Similarly, the evolving digital payment and lending ecosystem demonstrates the capacity for AI integration in the financial sector. In the trade sector, the presence of marketplace platforms that link small shops to large consumer goods producers indicates progress. However, despite a significant potential for AI exposure, the healthcare sector faces challenges due to low connectivity, with only a third of hospitals connected to the internet. This presents a prime opportunity for public and private partnerships to leverage AI advancements.

Figure 4. Peru: Labor Force Complementarity and Exposure to AI by Sector

Sources: ILO; Peru ENAHO; Pizzinelli et al. (2023); IMF staff calculations.

23.   Another critical factor influencing AI's impact on employment within these sectors is the price elasticity of demand. In the sectors mentioned, this elasticity tends to be relatively high. Consequently, if automation leads to reduced prices, there should be an increase in demand, prompting growth in these sectors. Since AI shows high complementarity in most of these areas, it is likely that an increase in production due to AI could result in job creation.

24.   Automation through AI also presents social challenges, as workers will need to transition to new jobs. About 17 percent of the workforce in Peru falls into a category characterized by high exposure to AI and low complementarity with it. This means that their tasks are susceptible to automation, reducing the necessity for human involvement. To ensure sustainable growth in the long term, it is crucial to encourage both current and future workers to develop skills for integrating AI into their work, while also taking steps to mitigate the risk of income loss during a job transition.

C. Advancements in FinTech and GovTech

25.   The progress in FinTech and GovTech in Peru suggests that there is capacity to initiate technological advancements and support productivity. This trend indicates Peru's ability to embrace AI innovations and enhance productivity.

FinTech

26.   Low financial inclusion and limited competition among incumbents in Peru creates opportunities for FinTech disruptions. The high 7-percent net interest spread points to still restricted access to finance (Figure 5).[5] In 2021, only 57.5 percent of Peruvians aged 15 and older had financial accounts, and just 22 percent borrowed from formal financial institutions.[6] In this regard, the expansion of FinTech can potentially increase competition among banks and improve financial inclusion (Bakker et al., 2023).

Figure 5. Peru: Competition and Financial Inclusion

Sources: Haver Analytics; the World Bank Findex database, BCRP, IMF staff calculations.
Note: The RHS chart includes end-2023 data for Peru from the BCRP, highlighting the impact of digital wallet proliferation (indicated in red); Findex data for other countries correspond to 2021, except for Mexico, which is updated for 2022.

**27.   Meanwhile, digital financial services are gaining momentum.** About half of the adult population is engaged in digital payments. This shift is underscored by the growth in digital wallet usage. In 2022, approximately 45 percent of Peruvians used digital wallets, a notable 12-percentage

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[5] Banks' net interest spread = loan interest rate – deposit interest rate.

[6] The World Bank's Global Findex Database 2021.

point increase from the year before.[7] Digital wallets helped boost financial inclusion to 65 percent in late 2023 (Figure 5).

28.   While the digital payment sector currently attracts the majority of FinTech users, the ecosystem is diverse, with startups flourishing across various domains. First, digital wallets and payment data enhance access to credit, as banks leverage this information to offer consumer loans. This improved access to financial accounts facilitates greater loan accessibility. Second, the FinTech ecosystem is rich, encompassing services such as cryptoasset exchanges, insurtech, enterprise technology provisioning, regtech, and wealthtech.[8] With about 300 startups, Peru boasts one of the highest numbers of FinTech startups per capita in the region.

Number of Fintech Startups in Latin America in 2022
(Number of fintech startups per person)

Sources: Latam Fintech, WEO 2023 and IMF staff calculations.

29.   To enhance the financial landscape, the authorities have implemented several key enabling policies. First, the BCRP permitted the first e-money provider to deposit funds in its accounts, thereby granting it access to the fast payment clearing house. Second, a 2022 regulation ensured interoperability among different digital wallets and payment systems, as a result, boosting competition among providers and improving the user experience. Third, the authorities are working on an Open Banking law, aimed at fostering competition among banks. This initiative promises to revolutionize the banking sector by enabling data sharing and innovative banking solutions. Fourth, virtual asset providers are now required to comply with Anti-Money Laundering (AML) regulations. This move ensures greater transparency and security in the expanding field of digital assets. Finally, the authorities are actively engaging with market participants to discuss and refine the regulatory sandbox, which can be helpful for testing and developing FinTech innovations in a controlled environment. These steps show a proactive approach towards embracing technological advancements while ensuring a secure and competitive financial environment to support productivity.

GovTech[9]

30.   Peru ranks highly in various GovTech rankings due to significant progress in digitizing its revenue administration at the central level. It stands out as a high achiever in the region—a

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[7] Index of Financial Inclusion by Credicorp.

[8] The Cambridge Fintech Ecosystem Atlas.

[9] GovTech, short for Government Technology, refers to the application of digital technologies, innovative solutions, and technological tools by government agencies to enhance public services, improve governance, increase efficiency, and promote transparency and citizen engagement. It involves the modernization of government operations and the delivery of government services through technologies such as cloud computing, big data analytics, artificial intelligence, and blockchain. For more information, see Amaglobeli et al. (2023).

region that scores better than AEs—and among emerging market economies. According to the World Bank (2023a), when compared to Latin America, the OECD, and emerging market economies, Peru consistently earns very high scores across all categories of the GovTech Maturity Index.[10] The central government is leveraging technologies such as cloud computing, big data analytics, blockchain, and artificial intelligence. Additionally, it is focusing on the implementation of application programming interfaces (APIs), which are crucial for improving the interoperability of government digital applications. Given the success of GovTech thus far, there is a solid foundation to extend these productivity-enhancing technologies to improve government efficiency and the outcomes even further. However, while GovTech highlights Peru's capacity to successfully implement cutting-edge reforms at the central level, sub-national gaps exist.

GovTech Maturity Index

Sources: The World Bank
Note: AE = Advanced Economies (Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Grece, Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macao, Malta, Netherlands, New Zeland, Norway, Portugal, Puerto Rico, San Marino, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United Kingdom and United States). EME = Emerging Markets Economies (China, India, Indonesia, Malaysian, Philippines, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Vietnam).

31.   While Peru has successfully implemented a range of important GovTech reforms aimed at enhancing revenue administration at the central level, progress lags in the regions. According to the 2021 International Survey on Revenue Administration (ISORA), 85 percent of tax payments by value were made electronically. Peru has also seen significant success with its 2013 electronic invoicing (e-invoicing) reform and is progressively encouraging a shift from paper-based to electronic invoices. A study by Bellon et al. (2019) demonstrated that the implementation of e-invoicing in Peru led to over a 5 percent increase in reported sales, purchases, and value-added for firms in the first year following the adoption of e-invoicing. This effect was particularly pronounced among smaller firms and in sectors with higher levels of non-compliance, indicating that e-invoicing improves compliance by reducing associated costs and strengthening deterrence measures. While e-invoicing has positive effects, tax collection is hindered due to shortcomings in Peru's VAT refund mechanism. At the same time, at the regional level, tax systems are predominately non-digital, particularly for land taxes which lack a comprehensive registry.[11] As land taxes are an important revenue source, increasing the use of GovTech could mobilize more revenue.

32.   The digitalization of public financial management (PFM) functions would enhance budget transparency and control. The authorities are embarking on a comprehensive digitalization of PFM, including for budget preparation, accounting, procurement, public investment, debt management, and payroll. The improvement builds on previous systems that were fragmented,

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[10] The subcomponents are supporting core government systems, enhancing service delivery, mainstreaming citizen engagement, and fostering GovTech enablers.

[11] A significant obstacle to the digitalization of land taxes is the absence of a comprehensive land registry.

thereby hindering interoperability. Most of the progress has been made at the central level, while sub-national implementation is limited.

33.   Peru is leveraging digital technology to enhance spending outcomes in education and health. The authorities are using GovTech to improve education delivery by collecting data at the community level to spur local engagement, as well as track the distribution of educational materials, and monitor attendance across the country (World Bank 2023b). In the health sector, in collaboration with the World Bank, efforts are underway to evaluate and enhance healthcare services, with a specific focus on improving the health information management system. Additionally, the COVID-19 pandemic acted as a catalyst for telemedicine, facilitating access to teleconsultations for cancer and diabetic patients during this period (Alvarez-Risco et al. 2021). Expanding internet access to more hospitals, beyond the current one-third, as well as to households can significantly improve access to and productivity of healthcare services.

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